THE JAKARTA CHARTER IN POST-SOEHARTO
INDONESIA: POLITICAL THOUGHTS OF THE ELITES IN
MUHAMMADIYAH

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ABSTRACT
As the world’s largest predominantly Muslim country, certain Muslim communities in Indonesia believe that the Jakarta Charter is an effective bridge to realize Islamic sharia due to its virtuous historical values. Nevertheless, the aim is not reached yet, as major Muslim groups and main political forces in the parliament assume that the Charter is no longer relevant in the current circumstances. This paper is an attempt to examine political thoughts of the elites in Muhammadiyah, the most influential Muslim-moderate organization in Indonesia, particularly concerning the annual sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999–2002. Indeed, elites in Muhammadiyah have a significant role to maintain the present and future political trajectory. Thus, it is a fascinating study in contemporary thoughts of the Muslim elites. As a result, the paper found three models of political thoughts in Muhammadiyah namely the moderate-transformative, the moderate-realistic, and the accommodating-pragmatic. Each thought has its features and reasons, but one thing for sure is that there is none of the elite in Muhammadiyah encourages the concept of the Islamic state.

Keywords: Jakarta Charter, Islamic sharia, elites in Muhammadiyah, political thoughts

INTRODUCTION
After the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesian political situation experienced rapid changes. The weakness of political Islam under New Order regime eventually reached its resurgence during reformation era by the desire to adopt Islamic sharia as an Indonesian principle. A number of Muslim communities want to put the content of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution. It can be seen that Indonesia as
the world’s largest Muslim country is the driving factor for Muslim people to apply the Charter as quickly as possible to gain a noble Islamic goal.

Therefore, when political Islam obtained its resurgence particularly under the president of Abdurrahman Wahid (famously known as Gus Dur) between 1999 and 2001, the amendment to the 1945 Constitution Article 29 on religion was a heated debate upcoming the annual sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999. Some Muslim communities and Islam-based political parties took this chance to change the Article by lobbying the others during the sessions (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 34).

Regarding the article 29 before the amendment, it consists of two fold point. Firstly, the state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God. Secondly, the state guarantees the freedom for each citizen to adhere their credence and worship (UUD, 1991; Kompas, 2/09/2002, 30).3

Various regional demonstrations demanded the parliament to implement the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution. In South Sulawesi, through “Declaration of Makassar”, local people desired to adopt Islamic sharia (Kompas, 2/11/2001, p. 7; 26/04/2001, p. 6). Likewise, it also took place in Banten, Cianjur, Aceh, and Padang. Even in the capital of the state, mayor of West Jakarta issued the rule on the obligation for Muslim pupils to wear an Islamic dress on Friday and follow the speech and praying Jumatan (Sumarjan et al., 2002, p. 1).

Other reinforcements to the Charter also came from militant Muslim organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir (The Freedom Party), Majelis Mujahidin (The Council of Jihad Fighters), Front Pembela Islam (The Islamic Defender Front, FPI), Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (The Council of Indonesian Islamic Propagation, DDII) and Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (The Indonesian Student Action Movement, KAMMI). They continuously carried out the protest rally in some regions (Ambardi, 2008, p. 217–218).

Conversely, Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama (NU),4 two largest predominantly Muslim organizations in Indonesia, rejected the Charter due to the consideration of the plurality among society.

To portray this point, the paper explores various political thoughts amongst elites in Muhammadiyah during transition era in post-New Order regime Indonesia. More interestingly, although Muhammadiyah issued an official decision to reject the introduction of Islamic sharia, its elites have different thoughts which will be scrutinized further.

**THE RISE OF ISLAMIC SHARIA IN THE TRANSITION ERA: A POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY APPROACH**

Historically speaking, the debate on the Jakarta Charter took place three times in the official session. First is in the sessions of Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence, BPUPKI) upcoming Indonesian Independence Day, held on May 29th–June 1st, 1945. Second is in the sessions of Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI), a day after the Independence, held on August 18th, 1945. Third is in the sessions of Majelis Konstituante (The Constitutional Assembly) 1955–1959. During these three sorts of the sessions, the Muslims-nationalist group wanted to make the Jakarta Charter an Indonesian principle. Meanwhile, the secular-nationalists group maintained that Indonesia is a multi-religious nation, and therefore, it should be a secular state which is characterised by the separation between politics and religion (Anshari, 1976, p. 23–78).

An analytical classification regarding the concept of polity in Indonesia was conducted by Assyaukanie (2009, p. 12–19, 57–176). His study’s finding demonstrates that there are three

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4 Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia established in Yogyakarta, November 18th, 1912. Meanwhile, Nahdhatul Ulama (The Renaissance of Islamic Scholars, NU) is the largest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia established in Surabaya (East Java), January 31st, 1926.

3 The original text in Indonesian version is 1) Negara berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa; 2) Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaan itu.
models of polity imagined and endorsed by Indonesian Muslims. First is the Islamic Democratic State (IDS). This model makes Islam as the basis of the state and advocates Muslims to have their fundamental roles in Indonesian and political life. Second is the Religious Democratic State (RDS) which underlines the significance of religious pluralist life in Indonesia and aims to make the state the guardian of all religions. Third is the Liberal Democratic State (LDS) or Secular Democratic State (SDS). The last model aspires to separate religions from the domination of the state (as is proposed in the second model) and advocates secularization as the basis of the state.

With regard to the Jakarta Charter in post-Soharto regime, the first and second models are a precise category to depict the reality surrounding the sessions of MPR between 1999 and 2002. More obviously, Sumarjan et al. (2002, p. 37) classify two distinctive thoughts. On the one hand, the Muslim-nationalist group concurs to apply the Charter because Indonesia is not merely the most populous Muslim country in the world, but Islamic sharia is also an alternative way to solve people’s problems due to the failure of secular laws. This thought was reinforced by Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party, PPP) and Partai Bulan Bintang (The Star Crescent Party, PBB). On the other hand, the nationalist-secular group refuses the Charter as the notion is no longer relevant with current circumstances. This group believes that the implementation of the Charter only create disharmony among people who have different belief and it will destroy Indonesian unity. The notion was supported by some major parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle, PDI-P), Partai Golkar (The Party of the Functional Groups), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party, PKB), and the Reform-Faction.

The debate amongst members of the parliament on the 1945 Constitution Article 29 eventually recommend four alternatives forms on the state principle as depicted in Table 1.

The nationalist-Muslim group states that the realization of the Charter can resolve public problems such as corruption, prostitution and casino. As the result, Muslim communities can worship calmly. Meanwhile, the nationalist-secular group believes that the Charter will discriminate small tribes and ethnics as well as affecting Indonesian disintegration (Sumarjan et al., 2002, p. 45). As a matter of fact, the result of the debate demonstrates that the Muslim group failed, as most members of parliament are not encouraging the Charter. However, although the Charter broke Muslim unity, according to some political analysts, the failure is not finale yet. The struggle should be continued, as winning or losing is part of the struggle (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 6).

Some Muslim communities believe that the seven words aim to earn better political life, but in fact its existence only affects Indonesian breakdown. It is a tricky choice, because there is no comprehensive dialogue among Muslim elites on the topic both on the notion of Islamic state and the strategy on how to fight for it. In addition, Muslim elites have no consensus for some major things. First is the notion of Islamic sharia and its institution in the national life. Second is political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Alternative Suggestions</th>
<th>Proponents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God.</td>
<td>PDIP and Golkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God with the obligation upon Muslims to carry out Islamic laws.</td>
<td>PPP and PBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God with the obligation upon the followers of each religion to carry out its teachings.</td>
<td>PKB and Reform-Fraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God, humanitarianism, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice.</td>
<td>None proponents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

strategy amongst Muslim elites. Third is the dilemma to decide whether to reinforce or reject the Charter. If the Charter is to be rejected, this group will be stamped as anti-sharia. On the contrary, if the Charter is to be approved, the group will be alleged as a fraction who takes advantage of the Charter as a political commodity. PPP was blamed for this case although it refuted. Other fractions testified that PPP doesn’t reinforce the Charter sincerely, just merely to attract Muslim supports (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 6).

The failure in implementing seven words of the Charter in the Article 29 is caused, at least, by four factors. Firstly, the notion does not obtain a support from major parties in the parliament. Secondly, two main Indonesian Muslim organizations both Muhammadiyah and NU assumed that the Charter is no longer compatible with current Indonesian circumstances. Thirdly, Muslim communities unanimously are still able to execute their organizational programs without changing article 29. Fourthly, the notion is merely part of the effort of small groups to increase popular supports (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2002, p. 34).

Theoretically, the emergence of reformation movement in 1998 and the desire to support the introduction of Islamic sharia during transition era is not an accident. It is a long history of political tensions among Indonesian elites as they have a political opportunity to do it. From various tensions, like an ice mountain, the peak of the turmoil affects the downfall of Soeharto as the president of Indonesia. As the result, a number of social movements, democratization waves, and reformation deeds emerge in the public sphere. Thus, to illustrate this situation—the desire to introduce the sharia, the paper attempts to apply a theory on political opportunity.

According to Tocqueville (Situmorang, 2007, p. 3–4), reformation movements will appear if the political and economic systems are changed from blocked to openness. McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1998) in particular explain how the political chance works within reformation movements. Firstly, social movements will emerge in the public sphere if the access of various political institutions is opened. Secondly, interest groups will appear when political circumstances are unstable while new political system is not shaped yet. Thirdly, social movements will come out when among political elites suffered gigantic conflicts and in turn, the conflicts are utilized by other actors to reach the political chance. Fourthly, social movements will be formed if elites who created the alteration are invited by other elites in the government to set up the change.

Tarrow (1998, p. 15) and Cragn et al. (Nd, p. 233–234) highlight that sort of political tensions will increase rapidly when the actors got external supports to solve the problems or to reach the goals. Charles D. Brockett and Dieter Rucht add as quoted by Situmorang (2007, p. 5) that the increasing of political tensions is caused by the opened access to political parties and government institutions which political actors got backing from other actors who have similar interests.

In the case of Indonesia, political anxieties during New Order regime were started in 1970s when General Soemitro resisted the policy of General Ali Moertopo. Consequently, student movements organized demonstration that condemn the economic policy in which government tends to receive foreign investors, failed to build economic prosperity as well as the rise of bribery cases among Indonesian elites. The tensions appeared for a second time in 1980s when LB. Gordani, Soeharto’s stalwart, criticized Soeharto’s interventions to military and his family involvement in business. It affected the military fraction in the parliament which asked the government to give freedom in political and economic affairs. Soeharto eventually concurred with the demand. Nonetheless, the conflict between Soeharto and military re-emerged when Soeharto decided to choose Harmoko as the top leader of Golkar and B. J. Habibie as his running mate which both figures are not originated from military. Indeed, Soeharto’s verdict expressed his disillusionment to the military (Situmorang, 2007, p. 64–65).

The conflict continuously took place in the following case when Soeharto replaced his cabinet with closed colleagues, even his daughter. This situation was not good for Soeharto’s administration. The peak of the tension occurred when Harmoko, the spokesperson of the parliament at the time, suggested Soeharto to resign from his position. This unstable tension was supported by the resignation of some ministries.
from the cabinet as well as the reinforcement of domestic and international parties. Besides, additional proponents came from a number of opposition elites such as Amien Rais (chairman of Muhammadiyah), Gus Dur (chairman of NU), Megawati (the nationalist activist), Nurcholish Madjid (public elder), Arifin Panigoro (businessman) as well as several NGO’s activists e.g. Adnan Buyung Nasution and Munir. They played a fundamental role to demand the reformation movement (Situmorang, 2007, p. 65–66).

ELITES IN MUHAMMADIYAH: CONCEPT AND ITS CLASSIFICATION

The term of “elite” etymologically means the richest, most powerful, best educated or best trained group in a society (Cambridge Dictionary, 2008; Oxford Dictionary, 2008, p. 145). According to Higley (2010, p. 1), this term academically was introduced by Pareto, Mosca and Michels in Europe. Scholars define elites as superior groups in society (Gauba, 2003, p. 440), the most talented and admirable individuals (Pareto, 1915/1935), organized and ruling classes who usually have a certain material, intellectual, and moral superiority over those they govern (Mosca, 1923/1939, p. 51), leaders who have an ability to control funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational power (Michels, 1915/1962; see Linz, 2006), a controlling group less than a majority in size (Dahl, 1958, p. 464), persons who are able to affect political outcomes (Higley, 2010), and individuals who are at the top of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic and social power (Putnam, 1976, p. 14). Thus, Higley (2010) posits that elites encompass not merely of prestigious leaders such as top politicians, important businessmen, high-level civil servants and senior military officers, but also less individually known leaders of mass organizations such as trade unions, important voluntary associations and politically consequential mass movements. Moreover, Whitmeyer (2002, p. 322) argues that elites are people with attributes that lead other to be ranked higher and accorded more prestige and respect than ordinary people. Meanwhile, Delican (2000, p. 334) explicitly assumes that the key concept of elites is “power” and whoever has the power, they are the leader of society. Heredity, wealth, intellect, organizations are the bridge to reach power. Thus, it can be understood that elites are petite quantities who have power to govern common people and to control organizational resources. They are brilliant and respected individuals who have strong influences to direct social changes.

In the context of Islam, the concept of elites can refer to Geertz’s (1976, p. 5–6) thesis on the classification Javanese society into three groups, i.e. abangan, santri, priyayi. More specifically, Mulkan (1989, p. 17) states that elites in Islam can be symbolized by kyai (Muslim elders), ulama (religious scholars, jurists), mubaligh (Islamic missionary, propagandist), and ustadz (religious/Islamic teachers). Nonetheless, there is vagueness on the concept between ulama and intellectual. According to Latif (2005, p. 583–585), it can be traced back since 1980s when most Muslim scholars particularly graduates of IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) studied to western colleges and pupils in secular schools earned Islamic teachings and vice versa. On the one hand, a number of intellectuals behave like mubaligh or ustadz by referring to Al-Qur’an verses. On the other hand, most ulama have an ability to illustrate their personality as an intellectual who can talk about secular topics. Afterward, the phenomena of Islamic colleges which have secular faculties (social and natural sciences) and ulama earn academic honorary insert the ambiguity this concept. Thus, it needs a new name for this category, i.e. Muslim intellectual. The term is frequently employed in the academic environment since 1980s, particularly to demonstrate explosive changes from intellectuals to ulama and ulama to Muslim intellectuals.

In Islam, elites can be classified into two groups: Ulama and Muslim intellectuals. There are threefold feature for ulama. Firstly, they have comprehensive knowledge, good quality in belief and attitudes and useful charities. Secondly, they have entire knowledge on Islamic studies such as aqidah (faith), moral and Islamic laws. Thirdly, they have wide-range knowledge on practical and experimental sciences (BRM, 1995, p. 14–15). Meanwhile, Muslim intellectuals also have
threefold feature. Firstly, they typically focus to analyze social problems and how to solve them. Secondly, they promote critical thoughts by creating models of community development. Thirdly, they wrote precious works and perpetually disseminate previous Muslim scholars’ works (Rahardjo, 1996, p. 24–26, 66).

By applying Putnam’s (1976) thesis on the classification of elites into three group namely positional (who hold official positions in organizations), decisional (who have capability to make policies), and reputational (those who have credentials as leaders), elites in Muhammadiyah can be defined as who became functionaries in the central board of Muhammadiyah between 1999 and 2005. The elites have influential power to direct public opinions and organizational decrees as well as maintain proponents’ doctrines. Therefore, elites in Muhammadiyah frequently have, at least, thoughts concerning the debate on Islamic sharia including the Jakarta Charter.

More specifically, elites in Muhammadiyah were restricted between 1999 and 2005. The year of 1999 is a period of replacement of Amien Rais by Syafi’i Ma’arif when Amien led PAN since 1998. Meanwhile, 2005 is a final period of Muhammadiyah under Syafi’i Ma’arif since he was elected for a second time as the chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in the 44th Congress in Jakarta, 2000. Selecting the period cannot be separated from the debate on the Jakarta Charter during the annual sessions of MPR 1999–2002. Table 2 revealed the functionaries of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in the period of 1999–2000 (post-Tanwir5 in Bandung).

In the following year, Muhammadiyah held the 44th congress in Jakarta, 8–11 July 2000. The congress eventually decided Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif as the chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 2000–2005. For more detail, the elites who assist Ma’arif leadership are presented in Table 3.

During Ma’arif leadership, Muhammadiyah succeeded to keep neutral relationship with the government and any political parties. Besides, a number of young elites at the time were elected such as Din Syamsuddin, Haedar Nashir, and Hajriyanto Y. Tohari. It demonstrates that Muhammadiyah appreciates and recruits young generation.

### Table 2. Functionaries of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 1999–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Elites</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Drs. H. Sutrisno Muhdam</td>
<td>Vice chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh</td>
<td>Vice chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>H. M. Muchlas Abror</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dr. H. A. Watik Pratiknya</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Drs. H. M. Syukriyanto AR</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>H. Rahimi Sutan</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Prof. Drs. H. Asjmuni Abdurrahman</td>
<td>Advisor for religious affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Prof. Drs. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, M.Sc.</td>
<td>Advisor for human resource and culture development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>H. Ramli Thaha, S.H.</td>
<td>Advisor for organisational affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dr. H. Yahya A. Muhamim</td>
<td>Advisor for educational affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais, M.A.</td>
<td>Advisor for political affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>H. Rusydi Hamka</td>
<td>Advisor for external affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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5 Tanwir is the highest meeting in Muhammadiyah after Muktamar (congress) which should be held, at least, three times for one period (AD/ART Muhammadiyah, 2011, p. 18).
### Table 3. Functionaries of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 2000–2005

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Drs. H. A. Rosyad Sholeh</td>
<td>Vice chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. M. Din Syamsuddin</td>
<td>Vice chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. M. Amin Abdullah</td>
<td>Vice chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Drs. H. Haedar Nashir, M.Si</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Drs. H. M. Goodwill Zubir</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dr. H. Abdul Munir Mulkhan</td>
<td>Vice secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Drs. H. Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, M.A.</td>
<td>Vice secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ir. H. M. Dasron Hamid, M.Sc</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dr. H. Bambang Sudibyo</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dr. H. Yahya A. Muhaimin</td>
<td>Advisor for research and educational affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. Ismail Sunny, S.H., M.C.L.</td>
<td>Advisor for political, human rights, and international affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. H. M. Dawam Rahardjo</td>
<td>Advisor for economy and community empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dr. dr. H. A. Watik Pratiknya</td>
<td>Advisor for healthy and people welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>H. M. Muchlas Abror</td>
<td>Advisor for organisational management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Prof. Drs. H. Asjmuni Abdurrahman</td>
<td>Advisor for religious affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Drs. H. M. Syukriyanto, AR., M.Hum</td>
<td>Advisor for human resources and autonomous councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Drs. H. Muhammad Muqoddas, Lc., M.Ag.</td>
<td>Advisor for Islamic propagation</td>
</tr>
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</table>


From both periods, the paper found nineteen names which can be categorized as the elite. They were Syafi’i Ma’arif, Amien Rais, Din Syamsuddin, Haedar Nashir, Rosyad Sholeh, Dawam Rahardjo, Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Muhammad Muqoddas, Goodwill Zubir, Malik Fadjar, Yahya Muhaimin, Rosyad Sholeh, Ismail Sunny, Watik Pratiknya, Syukriyanto AR, Muchlas Abror and Hajriyanto Y. Tohari. These names gave significant thoughts concerning the Jakarta Charter. The rest is not selected as they have no statements and no academic works regarding the topic.

## POLITICAL THOUGHTS OF THE ELITES IN MUHAMMADIYAH

Political thoughts can be grasped as the perception and attitude which based on the belief, knowledge and previous experiences. To classify the elites’ thoughts, the paper applies two opposite models. First is inclusive thought. It prefers to adopt substantial values rather than symbolic ways. It can be found in some models of thoughts namely transformative, critical, realistic, accommodative and pragmatic. Second is exclusive thought. It intends to use formalistic and symbolic texts rather than universal values. It can be found in the type of formalistic, idealistic, and totalistic thoughts.

According to Indonesian Muslim scholars, the totalistic, idealistic and formalistic thoughts stress that Al-Quran and As-Sunnah are the only guidance for Muslim daily activities (Anwar, 1995, p. 144–183; Fakih, 2001, p. 35; Nashir, 2000, p. 150–151; Jurdi, 2010, p. 40). Solution to overcome the problems in the social, economic and political fields should be based on the two Islamic fundamental sources. Meanwhile, the attitude of moderate and substantive underline their outlooks on the substance of Islamic teachings. Islam has the whole doctrines and principles and it should be transformed to resolve particular problems in different cases. Furthermore, the transformative stresses its thoughts on human values. Islamic teachings should be transformed...
into reality in order to liberate human from ignorance, injustice, and backwardness. Besides, it should be written into scholar works to affect social changes.

Afterward, the critical highlights its thoughts on problem solving by paying attention into the government system. Structural approaches will help to identify injustice and misunderstanding in seeing a reality such as terrorism acts. Additionally, the realistic thought emphasizes the relationship between substantive meaning and realities. Islam must be understood into different meaning because of various cultures. Moreover, the accommodative thought points up cooperation with other parties although it still gives critiques towards injustice deeds. This thought is flexible in coping with political dynamics. Last but not least, the pragmatic thought views that Muslim people should apply practical ways in the political stage and leave idealistic outlooks. This thought avoids personal and communal conflicts.

Muhammadiyah already issued an official letter with the number 10/EDR/1.0/1/2002 concerning the explanation of the attitude of Muhammadiyah towards the implementation of Islamic sharia and the change of the 1945 Constitution Article 29. The letter was signed by the chairman and secretary of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif and Haedar Nashir in Yogyakarta, August 16th, 2002. Moreover, the letter was circulated among Muhammadiyah members and supporters across the country through an authorized magazine Suara Muhammadiyah and an organizational report book Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah (BRM). In various meetings and religious teachings, regional leaders of Muhammadiyah also disseminated the letter, even discussed it.

With respect to the content of the letter, this is some relevant sentences:

“… As one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia which had participated to solve national problems, Muhammadiyah cannot avoid from a current controversial issue. Thus, Muhammadiyah officially rejects the notion of the change of the 1945 Constitution Article 29. It does not mean that Muhammadiyah refuses Islamic sharia in Indonesia as common people misunderstood as well as Muhammadiyah members and supporters.

Muhammadiyah as an Islamic propagation movement certainly reinforces the concept of whole Islamic sharia, because implementing Islamic teachings is part of Muslim faith.

… Muhammadiyah usually considers the circumstances and other significant aspects to decide a strategy. Believing to Islamic sharia and its implementation is compulsory for Muslims, but the strategy can adjust with contemporary circumstances. As a result, Muhammadiyah believes that using the seven words explicitly into the Constitution is not a precise approach. This assumption is based on two things. First is the reality that Muslim power in the parliament is petite. Second is the terrible impact of disharmony amongst religious people. For now, through Muslim elites in the parliament, Muhammadiyah expects that the rules are not contradicting with sharia and asks to revise the rules which opposed with Islamic values. Most importantly, the realization of sharia should be reflected in Muslim daily activities in order to give peaceful values…”

However, as a matter of fact, elites in Muhammadiyah have distinctive thoughts towards the official decree. It demonstrates that the pattern of the leadership in Muhammadiyah has various models. The paper analyses that from both literature and interview references, elites in Muhammadiyah have, at least, three distinctive political thoughts concerning the Jakarta Charter in-post Soeharto regime.

1. The Moderate-transformative Group

This group has a number of features. Firstly, they believe that Islam is a humanist religion which has universal tenets. Secondly, they are emphasizing more in solving social problems, teaching civil rights, and divesting people from backwardness and social injustice rather than struggling with Islamic-formalistic symbols. Thirdly, Islamic values should be implemented in community empowerment activities by creating social institutions such as NGO. Fourthly, the values have to be reflected into advantageous works which have people welfare-oriented goals (Al-Hamdi, 2013, p. 281).

Sociologically, they are academicians and social activists in NGOs. Their thoughts occasionally became a heated issue in public spaces.
Most of them studied in western colleges and, at least, understood western perspectives and methodologies. This paper identifies some elites in Muhammadiyah such as Syafi’i Ma’arif, Dawam Rahardjo, Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, and Haedar Nashir. In addition, this group has a wide relationship with various communities embracing the Muslim liberal group or “Islamic Left”. Therefore, the stamp “liberal thinker” is frequently closed to them.

Prior to the breakdown of New Order regime, Ma’arif (1984, p. 76) evidently rejected the implementation of the Jakarta Charter as the state principle. He believes that the engagement of Muslim elites in two historical moments, the sessions of PPKI and Majelis Konstituante, which discussed the Constitution is tangible that Islamic sharia is no longer applicable in Indonesia. Thus, when certain Muslim communities wish to implement the Charter, Ma’arif assumes that the notion will be supported merely around ten percent of parliamentarians (Kompas, 7/02/2002). His prediction is not wrong. The finale decision of the annual session of MPR stated that Pancasila is still the Indonesian principle.

Nonetheless, Ma’arif (1996, p. 31) has an understanding to the first principle of Pancasila. He is not hesitant that the Godliness principle is an alteration for seven or eight lose words. It depicts monotheism teachings as an Islamic belief. Afterward, the principle also allowed non-Muslims to adhere their faith. According to the Qur’an, Muslims are prohibited to force other to follow their credence. This view, as a matter of fact, ultimately became an authoritative attitude of Muhammadiyah.

According to Rahardjo (2002, p. 241–242), Pancasila is a synthesis between tradition, religion, and modernity in contemporary Islamic tradition. Pancasila is an excellent contemplation of Indonesian intellectuals in searching an identity. Thus, Pancasila is not only an identity for Muslims but also for Christians, Catholics, Buddhist, Hindu as well as Confucians. Moreover, Rahardjo believes that the emergence of Pancasila will eliminate extremist-radical Muslim movements. On the contrary, if Islam–social Islam, cultural Islam, and political Islam is feeble, Pancasila will suffer similar fate.

“… The history for a long time has created Islam as main aspect for nationality. Pancasila without Islam is like a skeleton without meat and soul,” Rahardjo wrote in his book (2002).

Meanwhile, Mulkhan evaluates that Muslims sadly are not considering real circumstances. They are more normative and romantic. As shown by the history that the Jakarta Charter repeatedly copes with the failure. Therefore, Mulkhan thinks that the implementation of the seven words is no longer compatible with recent Indonesian cultures.

“Who want to support the Charter? Previous evidences demonstrated the failure. Nowadays, Muslim politicians not merely enrolled with Islamist parties like PKS and PPP, but also signed up with Golkar, Democrat, PDI-P, and other secular parties,” Mulkhan said in his residence in Kotagede, Yogyakarta, 20 October, 2010.

Thus, he provides an alternative notion on the pattern of the state with the concept of “substantial-Islamic state”. The notion has similar values with Muhammadiyah’s goal: Masyarakat Islam yang Sebenar-benarnya (the real Islamic society, known as MIYS). If this is the concept of Islamic state, the citizens are not obligated to join up with Islam, but they only conduct daily activities which are appropriate with Islamic values.

“It is my concept on Islamic state, not Kartosuwiryo’s version,” he added obviously.

Likewise, Nashir (2007, p. 220–281) assumes that Muslim communities have to consider historical proofs. If the Muslim community is only trapped to implement Islamic sharia, they have no capability to deal with the future. Thus, Abdullah (2002, p. xiii-xiv) believes that the universal values in Islam should be contextualized and transformed into local cultures. We will meet with various local customs which they have different values on goodness and badness. In other word, Abdullah explains that local customs have philosophical messages in a number of social aspects–spiritual, morals as well as critiques.

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6 See, Al-Qur’an Surah Al-Baqarah verses 256.
2. The Moderate-realistic Group

This group has some features. Firstly, they are confident that there is a correlation between the substances of Islamic tenets with the reality, and in turn the universal values in Islam have to be presented among different society. Secondly, they prefer to struggle by applying a slogan “politics of salt” rather than “politics of lipstick”. It is more suitable with Islamic values. Thirdly, it is possible to contextualize Islam with local customs in order to attract other communities to understand Islamic teachings with distinctive ways. This paper ultimately detects some elites in Muhammadiyah: Amien Rais, Malik Fadjar, Yahya A. Muhaimin, Ismail Sunny, Watik Pratiknya, Rosyad Sholeh, Muchlas Abror, Syukriyanto AR, Hajriyanto Y. Tohari, Muhammad Muqoddas, Asjmuni Abdurrahman, and Goodwill Zubir (Al-Hamdi, 2013, p. 282).

Sociologically, they are lecturers as well as civil servants in the state institutes. Most of them graduated from western colleges. This group has close linkages with various segments in the society and helps them to solve their problems. Even some of them held governmental positions both in legislative and executive such as Amien Rais, Malik Fadjar, and Yahya Muhaimin.

Rais argues that Pancasila as the state ideology is adequate to represent Indonesian Muslim interests. On the contrary, the notion of Islamic state will trigger religious conflicts amongst society. Therefore, the Indonesian constitution has the aroma of “Theo-democracy”.

“The Article 29 can be changed eternally,” Rais said obviously.

Furthermore, Rais (2008, p. 12–13) expects that Islam should apply the philosophy of “politics of salt” rather than “politics of lipstick or flag”. He states that the lipstick or flag, indeed, will appear in the public, but unfortunately its advantages cannot be tasted immediately by people.

“So, why we are still fascinated to display the flag or wear the lipstick thickly?” Rais asked as quoted in www.majalah.tempointeraktif.com, 5 November, 2001.

Rais is optimistic that Pancasila is the best way that Indonesia does not get caught up in secularism or theocracy.

“For the future of sharia, when Muslims in Indonesia have an obvious objective and most members of parliament concur to establish the Islamic state, that’s a precise time to decide it,” Rais added (2008, p. 13).

Muhaimin has a similar thought that theo-democracy is the greatest way for the state principle. If Indonesia utilizes secular system like America and Turkey, it will curb human rights to worship, conversely, if Indonesia applies theocracy system, it will discriminate the plurality among Indonesian society. Although Muhaimin agrees with Pancasila, he still criticizes that Pancasila, however, has no obvious goal. As a matter of fact, Pancasila cannot guarantee people’s rights in the case of Prita Mulyasari, Minah, and other marginal citizens.

“They are some victims of the ambiguity of Pancasila. Thus, the government must rule this affair. The grains of Pancasila is not merely to be memorised,” Muhaimin said at the office of Department of International Relation, Gadjah Mada University, 29 October, 2010.

Furthermore, Fadjar utters that we have to learn from Indonesian long history. In fact, the Jakarta Charter is no longer relevant with current circumstances although the values of the 1945 Constitution is suitable with Islamic teachings.

“If the Charter eventually is applied, it will be exploited by certain interest groups. The group will say that this is halal (allowed in Islam) and that is haram (prohibited),” he confirmed in his house in Yogyakarta, 23 October 2010.

Tohari assumes that the driving factor of interest conflict among Muslim elites is that they have no consensus about Islamic state. They have dissimilar perspectives with regard to the amend- ment Article 29 during the MPR’s sessions.

Moreover, Syukiyanto also has a similar thought. He suggests that we are not only too formalistic but also implement the substance of Islamic tenets.

“If the Jakarta Charter is utilized as the state principle, but the people are not practicing it, could we enforce it?” Syukiyanto asked.

Syuki obviously rejects sort of religious propagation by employing violence and brutality movements. He argues that we have to build gigantic power to resist corruption and awful bureaucracy. To build the power, Muslim communities can create it through economy (such as Islamic-based banks), education (such as Islamic schools and colleges) as well as other potential channels.

“If it is clear, we can use the Charter as the basis of the state,” he added.

More specifically, Syuki provides a real instance that he has a Muslim friend in Bali. The friend develops a ranch and irrigation surrounding his dwelling. The ranch and irrigation give various advantages for society as well as non-Muslim inhabitants. As the result, the society respects him and offers to build a mosque beside his home.

“It is a story that the Islamic propagation not employs violence ways, but by applying peaceful,” he told in the headquarters of the central board of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 19 October 2010.

The last refusal to the Jakarta Charter revealed in the article of Sunny (1995, p. iii-vii). He believes that the first principle of Pancasila is part of God’s teachings. Thus, the Charter is not required to be embraced in the Constitution.

“That’s good if the seven words in the Article 29 are merely maintained in the regulation, as the Constitution commonly rules the state and the nation. Regarding the seven words is too technical,” Sunny, who became an ambassador of Indonesia for Saudi Arabia, explored in a press conference at the headquarters of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah as cited in Kompas, 7 February 2002.

3. The Moderate-accommodative Group

This group has some features. Firstly, they have cooperative and accommodative attitudes towards various interest groups. Secondly, they assume that an ideology is not too fundamental for political matters. They prefer seeking a legitimate foundation to strengthen a bargaining position with other competitors. Thirdly, they have inconsistent attitudes in reacting to Muslim politics. We will find these attitudes to the personality of Din Syamsuddin (Al-Hamdi, 2013, p. 283).

On one occasion, when Muhammadiyah officially rejected the notion of Islamic state, Syamsuddin powerfully reinforces this decision. Prior to his position as one of the chairmen in Muhammadiyah, Syamsuddin wrote in Journal of Ulumul Qur’an No. 2 Vol. IV (1993, p. 4–9) that he obviously rejected the implementation Islamic sharia in Indonesia. Furthermore, in his following article, Syamsuddin (2000, p. 43–44) believes that the notion of Pancasila essentially is Islamic state. It can be seen that, in fact, Pancasila reached a noble position among society and has similar meaning with universal Islamic tenets such as tauhid (unity of God), humanism, fraternity, democracy, and justice. Thus, Pancasila is frequently called as a model of principle for a religious democracy.

“Pancasila will receive a respected position. It is not only based on a constitutional guarantee but also an acknowledgment in Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (The Outlines of State Policy, GBHN) that Pancasila is a foundation for the national development while religion is a spiritual and moral foundation for the development,” Syamsuddin stated.

On the other occasions, Syamsuddin who appeared as a Muslim figure gives an approval statement to the implementation of the Jakarta Charter as the basis of the state. At the time, Syamsuddin assumes that we should consider the notion of the implementation Islamic sharia, because, indeed, Islamic teachings repeatedly are eliminated from the national life (www.majalah.tempointeraktif.com, 5 November 2001). Furthermore, Syamsuddin suggests that it is a sparkling notion if we can adopt Islamic sharia in decentralization
era. The sharia will change previous constitution and provide solution for a better circumstance (Republika, 19 October 2001).

“As a matter of fact, the implementation of Islamic sharia needs a long time. First of all, we must give a positive impression to the public that the discourse on sharia is not scary. Thus, we do not hurry,” Syamsuddin explained in a public lecture on Islamic studies in Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 13 October 2001.

However, Syamsuddin states that if we count the vote in the parliament, the support to the Jakarta Charter will fail. It means that most Islam-based parties do not concur with the Charter. The proponent of the Charter is merely PPP, PK, and PBB.

“I’m saying yes to the Islamic sharia, but the struggle to realize it is a different matter” he added as cited by Republika, 19 October 2001.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
To sum up, the given data said that although Muhammadiyah officially declared to reject the introduction of Islamic sharia, in fact, we found different political thoughts among its elites. There are three kinds of model of political thoughts in response towards the Jakarta Charter during reformation era:

1) The moderate-transformative. This group rejects to establish an Islamic state due to the plurality of Indonesia with a number of cultures and ethnics. They prefer to adopt substantive values of Islam and stress that Islamic tenets should be transformed to solve social problems such as alleviating poverty, eradicating corruption, and restoring education system.

2) The moderate-realistic. This group prefers to utilize the philosophy “politics of salt” rather than “politics of lipstick” as well as refuses symbolic and violence ways. Thus, it is impossible to implement the notion of Islamic state in Indonesia because of its complex society.

3) The moderate-accommodative. This group frequently demonstrates accommodative and cooperative attitudes to others. Thus, they never give an extreme position to any cases. If they conduct it, it will damage their image. They usually tend to exploit political opportunities to appeal Muslims sympathy.

It is noticeable that among three models of thought, there are no elites who concur to establish the Islamic state although current dynamics demonstrated that a few of local elites in Muhammadiyah do not refuse the notion. Nonetheless, Islamic sharia permanently will be a part of Indonesian political dynamics due to the majority of the Muslims within. Current issues regarding extremist-Islamic movements around the world such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria are the real evidence that Indonesia is the main target for these hazardous organizations to establish the Islamic state.

Therefore, Muslim elites have to contribute their most excellent thoughts to invent Islam as a universal religion whose claims of being salih li kulli zaman wa makan (suitable for all times and conditions) and to create Indonesia to become baldatun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur (a welfare and secure state). We should also encourage and promote bravely these notions. If not, the notion on the establishment of the Islamic state threatens the development of democracy and sovereignty in Indonesia.

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